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Neenah owed them royalties from this discounted water. Neenah
asserted that the doctrine of laches precluded the Howes from
bringing this action. The trial court determined that under the 1991
Agreement, the Howes received Neenah's quarterly sales records, and
in 1995, were aware of potential problems with Neenah's
compensation for water sales. However, by waiting until 1999 to bring
a claim related to this activity, the Howes satisfied the doctrine of
laches. Thus, the Howes were precluded from bringing this breach of
contract claim, and the appeals court affirmed the trial court's
summary judgment ruling for both breach of contract claims.
David W. Hall
WYOMING
Wilson v. Lucerne Canal & Power Co., 77 P.3d 412 (Wyo. 2003)
(holding court's procedural due process requirements met,
concerning injunction and proceedings, where injunction merely
reiterates known obligations under preexisting injunction, and
holding that, where appellant has not met burden of producing
evidentiary record, and record not otherwise available, court assumes
findings at trial based on sufficient evidence).
In the Wyoming District Court for Goshen County, Lucerne Canal
and Power Company ("Lucerne") filed for an injunction preventing
Thomas and Helen Wilson ("Wilsons") from interfering with its
easements on their land. During earlier litigation, between 1988 and
1990, the Wilsons filed a Consent to Entry of a Preliminary Injunction
with the court. The parties settled the litigation without trial in 1990
through a consent degree, which contained a permanent restraining
order restraining the Wilsons from interfering with Lucerne's
easements. In 2002, Lucerne filed again for a restraining order, which
the district court granted. The Wilsons appealed to the Wyoming
Supreme Court, alleging procedural deficiencies and abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial judge.
Lucerne was a private irrigation company that delivered water from
the North Platte River to its members. Some of Lucerne's facilities lay
on the Wilsons' land. According to the 1990 consent decree,
Lucerne's easement and right-of-way for its canal and associated
facilities dated to an 1894 federal grant, and ran with the land.
The original consent to preliminary injunction, the 1990 consent
decree's permanent injunction, and the 2002 permanent injunction all
enjoined the Wilsons from interfering in any manner with Lucerne's
use of its easements, which included easements on the river and on a
roadway. Each document ensured Lucerne full access to operate,
maintain, and renovate both its easements and its facilities thereon for
the purpose of making its water deliveries. By the beginning of
litigation in 1988, the Wilsons had a history of interfering with
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Lucerne's ability to make its deliveries by capturing water upstream of
Lucerne's diversion facilities.
Appealing the 2002 injunction, the Wilsons alleged that the trial
judge abused his discretion by failing to enter an order consolidating
the trial on the merits with the proceedings for injunction. The
Wilsons asserted the court's procedural failure deprived them of
notice, prejudicing their argument and violating their right to due
process. They premised their argument on the additional assertion
that the 2002 injunction contained terms different from those in the
1990 consent decree, and was therefore a different injunction. The
Wilsons further challenged the injunction for insufficient factual basis
and lack of specificity.
The court acknowledged that the Wilsons correctly cited the rule
directing trial courts in Wyoming to consolidate trials with hearings for
injunction, but found that the rule's applicability involved
considerations specific to the case. The purpose of the rule was to give
notice of application for injunction and prevent prejudice to the
parties. The court found, though, that the 2002 injunction reiterated
the 1990 consent decree, requiring nothing not already required.
That being so, the 1990 decree constituted notice to the Wilsons as to
their rights. Furthermore, since the 1990 decree had determined the
rights at issue, they were resjudicata,and could not be retried in 2002.
The trial court's procedural conduct could not have prejudiced the
Wilsons as to issues previously determined and not before the court.
The Wilsons asserted that language concerning duration of the
easements, differing between the two injunctions, resulted in different
injunctions. The 1990 injunction provided that Lucerne's easements
remained as long as it operated its irrigation facilities thereon. The
2002 injunction provided for Lucerne's perpetual use of the easement
for its irrigation facilities. The court rejected the Wilsons' assertion,
since the easements would logically cease to exist, in each instance, in
the event Lucerne ceased to operate its irrigation facilities. The court
also rejected the Wilsons' due process allegation, since the 2002
injunction did not alter their rights.
The court next addressed the Wilsons' allegation that the trial
court's findings lacked sufficient factual basis. The court examined
the issue without benefit of facts from trial, which were not recorded.
The Wilsons also did not produce a record of the facts in accordance
with their burden as appellants. Given no indication to the contrary,
the court assumed that the facts before the trial court provided
sufficient basis for its findings.
Finally, the court rejected the Wilsons' assertion that the
injunction lacked required specificity. The purpose of the specificity
requirement, the Court said, was to prevent uncertainty and confusion.
The 2002 injunction was effectively identical to the 1990 injunctionin effect for twelve years. The Wilsons could not claim uncertainty and
confusion as to rights and restrictions long since decided and in force.
Owen Walker

